Wiener's short secret exponent attack is a well-known crypt-analytical result upon the RSA cryptosystem using a Diophantine's method called continued fractions. We recall that Wiener's attack works efficiently on RSA with the condition that the secret exponent d < . We remark that our result is slightly better than the previously mentioned attacks.
INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of time until 1970's, the technology for practicing secret communication, which is widely known as encryption and decryption, was always done in a symmetrical manner. In early 1978, the RSA cryptosystem (Rivest, R., Shamir, A. and Adleman, L, 1978) that was introduced (abbreviated accordingly to its creator; Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) became a phenomenon in the world of secrecy of which was regarded as the first practical realization of the asymmetric cryptosystem as opposed to symmetric cryptosystem.
The core design of the RSA cryptosystem is based on the numbertheoretic object called the integer factorization problem. The intractability to solve the said problems with current computational power is the source of its security (i.e. particularly in factoring of the form = ). Additionally, another source of security of RSA cryptosystem lies on the difficulty to solve the RSA key equation of the form ≡ 1(mod ( )) where ( ) = ( − 1)( − 1). Solving the RSA key equation meaning that the objective is to recover the unknown value of , given only and . This will be the focus in this work.
For practicality purpose, the private exponent of RSA decryption is tended to be made small, thus the RSA cryptosystem will have tremendous decryption speed. However, if is upper bounded by (Wiener M., 1990) observe that such secret exponent can be easily solved in polynomial time. The observation is made based on the key equation − ( ) = 1 and can be solved efficiently via continued fraction method.
The main idea behind Wiener's attack to solve for the parameter that satisfy the inequality | − | < 1 2 2 . In fact, a classical Legendre's theorem of continued fraction expansion shows that the value of could be efficiently obtained from the list of convergent of . Thus, as the security of the RSA cryptosystem matters, it was proposed that such must be generated by choosing an integer larger than Alternatively, even though and are not close, (Maitra, S. and Sarkar, S., 2008) considered the case of the primes and 2 are too close. Furthermore, (Maitra, S. and Sarkar, S., 2008) showed that by replacing the − 2 1/2 + 1 from the result in ( .
Motivated from the earlier work of (de Weger, B., 2002) and (Maitra, S. and Sarkar, S., 2008) We remark that our result is slightly better than the previously mentioned attacks in (Wiener M., 1990) and (Nitaj, A., 2013) . This paper was written in five main sections. In Section 2 we give definitions and useful theorems that are needed in our work. Section 3 provides mathematical proof of our result. We illustrate two numerical examples to show how the attack was conducted and performance analysis by comparing with Wiener's (Wiener M., 1990 ) and Nitaj's (Nitaj, A., 2013) attack's, respectively in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we end with a conclusion of our work. 
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we state the definition of continued fraction and useful theorems that form the basis for this paper. These include the result from (Wiener M., 1990) and (Nitaj, A., 2013 then is a rational number amongst the continued fraction's convergent of . Suppose = is an RSA modulus where the bit-length of the primes and are in the same size (i.e. < < 2 ). Such condition will be used throughout this paper. 
OUR RESULT
In comparison to the (Wiener M., 1990) and (Nitaj, A., 2013 ) bounds of which Proof. The first statement is straight forward. Now, we provide the proof for the second statement. Observe the relation of ( + ) 2 = ( − ) 2 + 4 . Thus, directly gives + > 4 > 2 1/2 .
We prove our main result as follows. 
Divides both sides of (1) by and take the modulus sign, thus we have
Let the public RSA exponent < ( ), then rearranging − ( ) = 1 we have
Thus (2) Hence, by making the secret value as the subject and plugging in the condition of Lemma 3.1, we have the following result Referring to the Example 4.2, the attack presented in this example use a much larger value of yet our attack still finds such secret integer . Note that, our attack works with the maximal value less than 1713218139 for the respective in both examples. Again, the secret integer from Example 2 is much larger than Wiener's upper bound (i.e.
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< 1142145426) and Nitaj's bound (i.e. < 1663506620), respectively. Hence, this is in a good agreement with our theoretical result, which is mathematically proven in Theorem 3.2 and as reported in Table 1 .
CONCLUSION
Note that Wiener's attack works efficiently on RSA with the condition that the secret exponent < 1 3 1 4 , which was using a Diophantine's method called continued fractions. Later, the upper bound was improved in Nitaj, A., 2013 satisfying < √ 6√2 6 1 4 . In this work, we present another proof of using continued fraction method that shows a way to obtain the secret exponent efficiently, satisfying < 1 2 1 4 . We conclude that our result is slightly better than the previously mentioned attacks, in term of both theoretically and practically, via numerical examples. 
